RESEARCH INTERESTS:
My research lies mainly in epistemology and where it intersects with philosophy of science and ethics.
PUBLICATIONS:
"Still No Hope for Conciliationism" (Episteme, forthcoming)
“X-Phi within its Proper Bounds” (Philosophical Psychology, 1-26, 2024)
“No Hope for Conciliationism” (Synthese, 203: 148, 2024)
"The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism" (Synthese, 200: 485, 2022)
"Moral Disagreement Skepticism Leveled" (Ratio, 34 (3): 203-216, 2021)
"Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to Turri" (Dialectica, 74(3): 495-509, 2020)
INVITED PUBLICATIONS:
“Skeptical Responses to Explanatory Solutions,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, (forthcoming), Symposium on Kevin McCain’s Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems.
WORKS IN PROGRESS:
Paper on Peer Disagreement Skepticism (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Defeat and Pessimistic Inductions against Philosophy (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Knowledge-How (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Underdetermination Skepticism (Under Peer Review)
"Still No Hope for Conciliationism" (Episteme, forthcoming)
“X-Phi within its Proper Bounds” (Philosophical Psychology, 1-26, 2024)
“No Hope for Conciliationism” (Synthese, 203: 148, 2024)
"The Insignificance of Philosophical Skepticism" (Synthese, 200: 485, 2022)
"Moral Disagreement Skepticism Leveled" (Ratio, 34 (3): 203-216, 2021)
"Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to Turri" (Dialectica, 74(3): 495-509, 2020)
INVITED PUBLICATIONS:
“Skeptical Responses to Explanatory Solutions,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, (forthcoming), Symposium on Kevin McCain’s Explanatory Solutions to Skeptical Problems.
WORKS IN PROGRESS:
Paper on Peer Disagreement Skepticism (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Defeat and Pessimistic Inductions against Philosophy (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Knowledge-How (Under Peer Review)
Paper on Underdetermination Skepticism (Under Peer Review)
CURRENT PROJECTS:
My current research is centered around a larger project – that will hopefully culminate in a book – on the nature and limitations of various skeptical arguments in epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of science. In brief, I aim to show that philosophers’ focus on skeptical arguments in these domains is misplaced since such arguments tend to be flawed in various hitherto unacknowledged ways. If sound, my arguments show that the path to knowledge in these areas is much easier than previously thought.
Click here to for my research statement.
My current research is centered around a larger project – that will hopefully culminate in a book – on the nature and limitations of various skeptical arguments in epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of science. In brief, I aim to show that philosophers’ focus on skeptical arguments in these domains is misplaced since such arguments tend to be flawed in various hitherto unacknowledged ways. If sound, my arguments show that the path to knowledge in these areas is much easier than previously thought.
Click here to for my research statement.
DISSERTATION:
My dissertation is entitled Defending Philosophical Knowledge and it concerns whether philosophy as a discipline can, and does, produce philosophical knowledge. Some support philosophical skepticism by arguing that the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions to justify philosophical beliefs is illegitimate because intuitions are an unreliable source of justification. Others argue that philosophical knowledge is untenable because philosophers rarely, if ever, resolve their philosophical disagreements despite spending their professional lives attempting to do so. In brief, the purpose of my dissertation is to show that philosophical knowledge is not threatened by either intuition or disagreement skepticism.
Click here for my dissertation summary.
My dissertation is entitled Defending Philosophical Knowledge and it concerns whether philosophy as a discipline can, and does, produce philosophical knowledge. Some support philosophical skepticism by arguing that the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions to justify philosophical beliefs is illegitimate because intuitions are an unreliable source of justification. Others argue that philosophical knowledge is untenable because philosophers rarely, if ever, resolve their philosophical disagreements despite spending their professional lives attempting to do so. In brief, the purpose of my dissertation is to show that philosophical knowledge is not threatened by either intuition or disagreement skepticism.
Click here for my dissertation summary.
